Between Individual Decisions and Collegiate Deliberations: Deciding How To Decide, Influencing the Outcome
Abstract How does the institutional design of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) interfere in the decision-making process of the conflicts that are submitted to it? STF’s Justices, as individually responsible of each proceeding in progress, can strategically decide through available procedural resources what and when to bring them to trial individually or collectively. This article inserts itself in this debate to question the independence of its Justices before the other political actors, but also before (or against) their peers, considering the possibilities of interaction of strategic models to the Brazilian case, before the constitutional, legal and regimental rules that establish the performance of the members of the Court. The general hypothesis is that the normative design of the Court assures multiple options for magistrates in the conduct of judicial proceedings, promoting strategies aimed at maximizing the winning chances of their preferences, as well as reducing their respective decision costs.